

Message Text

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H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 MC-02 /091 W
-----111800Z 127090 /53

P R 111628Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6418
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
CINC EUR VAHINGEN
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BONN 04427

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR, GW
SUBJECT: THE RUTH VISIT: FRG VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE FRG PLAYS AN INDISPENSABLE ROLE
IN THE VARIOUS MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.
THE POSITIONS WHICH THE GERMANS TAKE IN THE MBFR TALKS
MAY WELL DETERMINE THEIR ULTIMATE SUCCESS OR FAILURE,
SINCE MBFR IS REALLY ABOUT TROOP REDUCTIONS ON GERMAN
SOIL. THE FRG HAS ADOPTED A POSITIVE THOUGH CAUTIOUS
APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY
UNTOWARD EFFECTS ON GERMAN SECURITY. THE GERMANS STRONG-
LY FAVOR CONTINUATION OF ALL SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, BELIEVING
THIS TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST AS WELL AS THAT OF THE WEST
IN SUSTAINING THE CLIMATE OF DETENTE. THE NEW ARMS
CONTROL COMMISSIONER, AMB. RUTH, WILL WISH TO ESTABLISH
A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH CARTER ADMINISTRATION

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OFFICIALS AND TO HARMONIZE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OUR
RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO THESE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS.
WE DESCRIBE BELOW SOME FRG VIEWS ON MBFR, SALT AND CCD
ISSUES ON THE EVE OF RUTH'S VISIT. END SUMMARY.

2. THE EMBASSY HOPES THE FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFOR-
MATION MAY BE HELPFUL TO WASHINGTON OFFICIALS IN PRE-

PARING FOR FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH'S MARCH 16-18 VISIT. WHILE THE GERMANS WILL HAVE BASICALLY A LISTENING BRIEF BECAUSE OF ONGOING U.S. POLICY REVIEWS ON MBFR, SALT, CTB, CW AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, RUTH AND HIS TEAM WILL BE INTERESTED IN MAKING CLEAR GERMAN CONCERNS AND INTERESTS ON THE VARIOUS SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AND HIS HOPE THAT THE BILATERAL WILL MARK THE BEGINNING OF A FRUITFUL, LONG-TERM DIALOGUE WITH NEW ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.

3. MBFR. THE FRG POSITION ON THE NEGOTIATIONS REMAINS THE ALLIANCE POSITION AND RUTH IS LIKELY TO STRESS GERMAN COMMITMENT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AS THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND COLLECTIVE REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS TO REACH THAT GOAL. RUTH HIMSELF IS A DOGGED ADVOCATE OF THE COLLECTIVITY PRINCIPLE. THE OTHER KEY ELEMENT OF THE GERMAN POSITION IS TO THWART SOVIET EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A DROIT D'REGARD OVER THE BUNDESWEHR OR TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY IN A FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT.

SINCE THE FRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN LAST FALL, SENIOR SPD POLITICIANS, SUCH AS BRANDT AND WEHNER, HAVE BEEN SENDING UNMISTAKABLE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SIGNALS TO THE SOVIETS THAT THE FRG IS INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS IN 1977. THE CHANCELLOR HAS ALSO SPOKEN OF NEW INITIATIVES. IT IS UNCERTAIN WHAT EVENTUAL INFLUENCE, IF ANY, THESE SPD MOVES WILL HAVE ON THE OFFICIAL POSITION. BRANDT WOULD SEEM TO SPEAK FOR
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PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 MC-02 /091 W

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P R 111628Z MAR 77

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6419

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

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SECURE AN MBFR AGREEMENT, EVEN IF ONLY A SYMBOLIC ONE. THE SPD CHAIRMAN APPEARS TO BELIEVE THAT DETENTE WOULD BE SERVED BY SUCH AN AGREEMENT AND THUS HE IS MORE INTERESTED IN A POLITICAL RATHER THAN A STRICTLY MILITARY ARRANGEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

BRANDT'S PUBLIC CAMPAIGN ALONG THIS LINE HAS BEEN ENDORSED NEITHER BY FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER NOR DEFENSE MINISTER LEBER, BOTH OF WHOM BELIEVE THAT FRG INTERESTS WOULD BE BETTER SERVED BY THE CURRENT ALLIANCE POSITION. THE COMBINED WEIGHT OF GENSCHER AND LEBER ON THIS ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED, AND IT DOES NOT APPEAR NOW THAT THE BRANDT LINE WILL CARRY THE DAY IN BONN. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE HAD INDICATIONS GENSCHER AND THE FDP ARE NO LONGER SO OPPOSED TO SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS. ACCORDINGLY, EVEN THOUGH A CHANGE IN THE SECRET

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FRG POSITION APPEARS DOUBTFUL, THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE EXCLUDED ENTIRELY.

RUTH IS ALSO AWARE OF THE SECRETARY'S DESIRE TO MOVE THE TALKS OUT OF THE "DOLDRUMS" AND RECOGNIZES THAT

STRONG POLITICAL FORCES IN BOTH COUNTRIES FAVOR PROGRESS IN MBFR. RUTH TOO FAVORS SUCH PROGRESS, ALBEIT A CAREFUL AND MEASURED PROGRESS IN WHICH FRG INTERESTS ARE SAFEGUARDED. HE, LIKE OTHER GERMANS, WANTS TO MOVE TOWARD AN MBFR ACCORD, BUT ONLY ONE THAT INCREASES RATHER THAN DECREASES FRG SECURITY. IT IS IN THIS LIGHT THAT HE AND THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL STUDY ANY NEW PROPOSALS, WHENEVER THEY ORIGINATE.

SHOULD THE ONGOING U.S. POLICY REVIEW BE TENDING TOWARD THE CONCLUSION THAT SOME CHANGES IN THE ALLIANCE POSITION MIGHT BE WARRANTED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE WOULD STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT AS MUCH OF OUR RATIONALE AS POSSIBLE BE CONVEYED TO RUTH AT THIS TIME IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FRG'S ROLE IN VIENNA. WE WOULD THINK THAT ANY PROSPECTIVE CHANGE IN THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION WOULD HAVE TO BE TIED IN SOME WAY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PARITY AND COLLECTIVITY IF WE EXPECT THE FRG TO BUY IT.

4. SALT. THE FRG HAS A VERY STRONG INTEREST IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS SINCE ANY AGREEMENT IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS FIELD MAY IMPINGE DIRECTLY UPON GERMAN SECURITY. SINCE SALT IS A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION, THE GERMANS ARE PERFORCE LISTENERS TO RATHER THAN PROVIDERS OF INFORMATION. THE GERMANS HAVE THUS FAR ACCEPTED U.S. ASSURANCES THAT THE FBS, NON-TRANSFER AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION ISSUES HAVE BEEN KEPT OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND A FONOFF OFFICIAL HAS TOLD US THE FRG POSITION WILL REMAIN WHAT IT WAS UNLESS AND UNTIL THERE ARE INDICATIONS THE U.S. MAY BE

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CONSIDERING A REVISED APPROACH.

GERMAN OFFICIALS ARE FOLLOWING WITH INTENSE INTEREST CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY RELATE TO SALT, WITH THE FRG CONCERNED THE U.S. MIGHT SURRENDER SOME OPTION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FULLER EVALUATION CAN BE MADE OF THEIR POTENTIAL USE. THE LATEST POSSIBILITY, A LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILE, HAS OF COURSE SPARKED INTEREST AMONG OUR CONTACTS. WHILE IT IS OBVIOUSLY TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD BE FEASIBLE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE GERMANS WILL WISH TO LEARN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS FOR DEVELOPING SUCH A SYSTEM AND WHAT CAPABILITIES LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES MIGHT HAVE.

THE GERMANS WANT TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO EVALUATE FUTURE POSSIBILITIES OF CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEMS, GIVEN THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE ON THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL FRONT. WHILE THE BRITISH, AS A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE, CAN LEGITIMATELY PHANTASIZE ABOUT

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PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 MC-02 /091 W
-----111758Z 127187 /53

P R 111628Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6420
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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CRUISE MISSILES (LONDON 03744), THE GERMANS MUST KEEP THEIR DAYDREAMS IN CHECK. WHILE WE SUSPECT THAT GERMAN MILITARY LEADERS HAVE TOYED WITH THE IDEA OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES ON GERMAN SOIL TO DETER THE SOVIET SS-20/BACKFIRE "EUROSTRATEGIC" THREAT, GERMAN POLITICAL LEADERS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A MOST CAREFUL LOOK AT ANY SUCH POSSIBILITY BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A MOVE FOR BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH FUTURE CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT POSSIBILITIES ARE NOW ONLY IN THE REALM OF PURE CONJECTURE, THE GERMANS WILL PAY VERY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO ANYTHING WHICH THE U.S. SIDE MAY HAVE TO OFFER ON THIS TEMPTING SUBJECT.

THE GERMANS ARE ALWAYS INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT AND MBFR. THIS PERTAINS
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BOTH TO THE POLITICAL AND WEAPON SYSTEMS ASPECTS OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIP. FORMER COMMISSIONER ROTH PURSUED THE QUESTION ON EVERY OCCASION AND RUTH HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN DOING SO.

REGARDING THE POLITICAL ASPECT, THE GERMAN PERCEPTION IS THAT SALT TAKES PRECEDENCE IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THEY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE THAT MEANINGFUL PROGRESS CAN BE ACHIEVED IN MBFR PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF A SALT II AGREEMENT. THE FRG DELEGATION WILL PROBABLY SEEK TO CORROBORATE THIS UNDERSTANDING.

AS FOR THE WEAPON SYSTEMS ASPECT, THE GERMANS WILL SEEK U.S. VIEWS ON HOW THE SS-20, BACKFIRE, ETC., MIGHT FIT INTO CURRENT OR FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE WELCOMING THE EXCLUSION OF FBS FROM SALT, THE GERMANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY OF THE POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MOBILE SS-20. FONOFF ARMS CONTROL OFFICIALS SHARE THE BELIEF EXPRESSED BY FORMER ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE THAT IT AND OTHER "GRAY AREA" SYSTEMS MUST AT SOME POINT IN TIME BE INCLUDED IN AN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION.

5. CCD ISSUES.

(A) COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB): THE OFFICIAL FRG DECLARATORY POSITION IS IN FAVOR OF A CTB. THE FRG BELIEVES NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA ARE PROBABLY SUFFICIENT TO VERIFY SUCH A BAN. HOWEVER, THE GERMANS WILL BE INTERESTED IN OBTAINING AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE U.S. POLICY REVIEW IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF POSSIBLE PROGRESS ON THE CTB ISSUE ON GERMAN SECURITY. THIS RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO THE QUESTION OF U.S. CREDIBILITY IN MAINTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE SHOULD THERE BE A SECRET

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CTB.

(B) CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW): THE FRG IS ACTIVELY WORKING AT THE CCD TOWARD A TREATY BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE FRG PAPER ON NEGOTIATING PRINCIPLES REPRESENTS THE LATEST GERMAN EFFORT AND GERMAN VIEWS ARE TO A LARGE EXTENT COMPATIBLE WITH OURS. SINCE THE FRG IS ALREADY PROHIBITED BY TREATY (1954 BRUSSELS TREATY) FROM POSSESSING A, B OR C WEAPONS, WE EXPECT THE FRG TO MAINTAIN ITS STRONG INTEREST IN A CW AGREE-

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PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 MC-02 /091 W
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P R 111628Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6421
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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MENT, LAYING PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE VERIFIABILITY
OF ANY TREATY.

(C) CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER: WHILE THE FRG IS
NOT A MAJOR SUPPLIER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS (RELATIVE
TO THE U.S., U.K., FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION) AND
FOLLOWS A RESTRICTIVE EXPORT POLICY, THE GERMANS WILL BE
INTERESTED IN HEARING OF POSSIBLE U.S. INITIATIVES BY
THE ADMINISTRATION TO RESTRAIN THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC
IN ARMS. WE WOULD EXPECT THE GERMANS TO BE GENERALLY
SUPPORTIVE OF ANY EFFORT ALONG THIS LINE.

6. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) CONVENTION. THE FRG HAS
NOT RATIFIED THE BW CONVENTION AND ASSERTS IT WILL NOT
SUBMIT IT TO THE BUNDESTAG UNTIL THE ALLIES AGREE TO
EXTEND THE CONVENTION TO BERLIN. THE ALLIES HAVE REFUSED
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TO DO THIS, ARGUING THAT MATTERS OF SECURITY AND STATUS
ARE INVOLVED. WHILE THE EMBASSY PERCEIVES LITTLE
FLEXIBILITY IN THE FRG POSITION, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE

U.S. SIDE EXPRESS OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN GERMAN
RATIFICATION.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, VISITS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 11-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BONN04427
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770084-0964
Format: TEL
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770370/aaaacjvx.tel
Line Count: 389
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 52df3dba-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3143156
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE RUTH VISIT: FRG VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
TAGS: PARM, GE, US, NATO, MBFR, (RUTH)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/52df3dba-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009